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Abstract 
This study looks at how social factors can be leveraged 
to dissuade online piracy in digital This study leverage 
persuasive computing to influence consumers' decision 
making process regarding their acquisition of online 
music and seeks to identify how different persuasive 
techniques can, in a pay way you want context, anchor 
the consumers' reference price to an amount 
significantly different from 0.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ugly spectacle of online piracy in digital goods 
has received much attention but how social factors can 
be leveraged to support, influence and manipulate legal 
shopping while dissuading piracy is not well 
understood. Digitized information goods such as 
music, books and movies are highly susceptible to 
piracy [1] because they can be copied at zero marginal 
costs [2] as creation and distribution technologies 
continues to advance ahead of existing strategies for 
their packaging, pricing and sale, especially with 
small-sized music files [3]. Thus, music providers are 
particularly challenged as they strive to be profitable in 
a digital economy where consumers can obtain music 
for free. Some early estimates suggested a decline in 
music sales from $13.7 billion in 1998 to $8.5 billion 
in 2008 (Recording Industry Association of America 
[4]), and industry players have been unequivocal in 
blaming this trend on online piracy. In addition, 
copyright protection technologies such as Digital 
Rights Management systems have been ineffective at 
combatting online piracy [5], and music content 
providers are being forced to rethink their digital 
business strategies [6]. 
  Consequently, music producers are reacting by 
delegating more pricing power to consumers through 
participating pricing schemes such as “Pay What You 
Want (PWYW)” and “Name Your Own Price 
(NYOM)” [7] in attempt to convert sales from “free” 
consumers. Such pricing schemes are only just 
emerging and their advantages over traditional fixed 
prices are yet to be established. The few studies 
conducted to date have reported that consumers pay 
positive amounts for music under PWYW due to pro-
social behaviors (e.g. [8]; [9]) although the amounts 
paid were unprofitable. More broadly, we are still 
limited in our understanding of what allows individuals 
to break from social and legal constraints to pirate 
digital music, and how participative pricing 
mechanisms can be effectively leveraged to persuade 
consumers to pay for online music.   
 The current study explores the welfare of music 
producers relying on PWYW pricing schemes to 
sustain profits. Such producers face the risk that 
consumers may exploit their control of prices and pay 
nothing at all or a price below the seller’s costs [10]. 
Additional persuasion may therefore be necessary to 
influence prices paid, but what and how persuasive 
techniques influence potential shoppers to yield 
desirable outcomes is unclear. Thus, we address this 
related question: How can consumers purchasing 
music in a PWYW scheme be persuaded to pay an 
amount different from $0? This question is important 
because it can potentially build on extant PWYW 
research to expand understanding of how consumers 
who have access to free online music can be converted 
to pay through legal channels.  
In the rest of the paper, we first briefly outline 
relevant literatures in participative pricing schemes and 
persuasive computing, and develop a research model to 
address our question. We then describe our on-going 
methodology for collecting data to empirically test the 
model. We conclude by discussing expected results 
and their anticipated theoretical and practical 
implications.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.2. Participative Pricing Schemes and Pay 
What You Want 
 
Pricing strategies generally aim to maximize 
sellers’ profits by capturing consumers’ heterogeneous 
product valuations and accounting for competition and 
cannibalization. This is because consumers’ reactions 
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to different prices may not be purely rational but driven 
by behavioral aspects such as perceptions and 
preferences [10]. Therefore, sellers are exploring 
innovative and unconventional pricing strategies such 
as auctions, Name-Your Own-Price, and Pay-What-
You-Want, that seek to involve consumers in the price-
setting process ([7]; [32]; [33]; [34]; [35]). The 
enabling role of the internet in providing a direct link 
to consumers has made it easier to implement 
participative pricing mechanisms [36]. Such 
mechanisms allow for differentiated prices and 
accounts for heterogeneous valuations of consumers to 
increase efficiency [37], while also enabling sellers to 
serve buyers who would otherwise be priced out of the 
market [2]. Participative pricing mechanisms have 
been shown to be effective and preferable for 
consumers. For example, consumers preferred to 
participate actively in setting the final price than to 
accept posted prices, and the higher perceived control 
of the buyers led to a greater intent to purchase [38]. In 
addition, consumers have higher fairness perceptions 
and satisfaction when they play a role in the price-
setting process than when the prices are set by the 
retailer [39]. Sellers implementing participative pricing 
model may also attract consumers’ attention, 
potentially leading to (new) customers as their 
popularity increases by word-of-mouth [10]. 
PWYW is the participative pricing model of 
interest in this study. It is different from other 
participative pricing models because buyers are given 
absolute control over the price-setting so that the buyer 
can set any price above or equal to zero which the 
seller cannot reject [10]. We focus on PWYW because 
it has been successfully implemented for online music 
(Radiohead’s In Rainbows album Oct to Dec 2007 who 
reported unprecedented profits) and gaining increased 
attention in online music research (cf. [8]; [9]). 
However, there is the risk that buyers exploit their 
control and pay nothing at all or a price well below 
seller’s cost [10]. Such a scenario will have several 
adverse implications for an online music provider 
implementing a PWYW model. Firstly, no minimum 
price is implemented that could protect the music 
provider against payment of $0. Secondly, under 
PWYW, the music provider supplies a legitimate 
channel for distribution to pirates. Therefore, the 
provider relinquishes any statutory protection they 
would otherwise enjoy under copyright laws. In effect, 
PWYW may provide an opportunity for pirates to 
legalize their activities while potentially denying the 
music provider the legal means for cost recovery or 
compensations for copyright infringement. Therefore, 
given the uncertainty of buyer’s pricing behavior in 
PWYW and the impact of PWYW on sellers’ revenues, 
it is important to explore additional persuasive 
mechanisms that can balance the scale in the music 
providers’ favor by encouraging buyers to be willing to 
pay an amount sufficiently different from $0. 
 
2.3. Persuasive Computing  
 
 Persuasive computing (the use of computers as 
persuasive technologies) can be a useful mechanism 
for increasing consumer willingness-to-pay for online 
music under a PWYW pricing model. Persuasive 
computing is a relatively new paradigm in human-
computer interaction (HCI) research that focuses on the 
use of computers to persuade behavioral change in 
users [40]. Persuasive computing draws on the 
Computer As a Social Actor (CASA) model [41] and 
the Media Equation theory [42] which both posit that 
individuals respond to and interact with media and 
technology just as they would in a social interaction 
with other individuals.   
Persuasive computing has been applied to study 
and encourage behavior change in a number of 
domains, notably health care and environmental 
sustainability. A survey of the literature shows that the 
targeted behaviors are often those that are entrenched 
and not easily amenable to change (e.g. smoking, 
dieting and physical activity in health care; energy and 
water use, air pollution, recycling and waste disposal in 
sustainability) [46]. Thus, persuasive designs present 
interventions for encouraging change in individuals 
toward desired behaviors when, left on their own, such 
individuals may not be aware of the need for change or 
may simply be comfortable with the status quo. We 
argue that in the context of this study, the behavior of 
individuals who consume online music for free can be 
described as behaviors that require specific 
interventions before change can happen. That is, ceteris 
paribus, “free” consumers will continue to perpetuate 
that behavior unless deliberate effort is expended to 
counter this behavior.  
At the core of persuasive designs is the notion 
that feedback on behavioral performance framed in a 
positive or negative way can guide individuals to make 
changes to favor the desired behavior or attitude [47]. 
When considering online piracy as a crime, one social 
theory from criminology that can be combined with 
feedback to change behavior is the theory of 
Neutralization Techniques [48]. Neutralization 
techniques theory posits that individuals' intentionally 
suspend their moral and conscientious compass 
temporary to commit an illegitimate act. That is, 
individuals learn techniques they can use to rationalize 
their actions and excuse themselves from personal 
responsibility for the time being in order to commit a 
crime [48]. Five types of justifications commonly used 
to neutralize demands for social conformity include: 
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denial of responsibility (“it is not my fault’), denial of 
injury (‘‘no harm will result from my actions’’), denial 
of victim (‘‘nobody got hurt’’), condemnation of the 
condemners (‘‘how dare they judge me, considering 
how corrupt and hypocritical they themselves are’’), 
and appeal to higher loyalties (‘‘there is a greater and 
higher cause’’) [48]. (See first column in Table 1). 
Neutralization techniques are best applicable to 
minor types of crimes and delinquency [49] which 
supports the theory’s applicability to music piracy [24]. 
Studies that have examined the use of neutralization 
techniques in digital piracy found a significant but 
weak link with software piracy ([50]; [51]), moderate 
levels of music piracy [24], and diminishing 
longitudinal effects in quasi-experimental field settings 
[29].  However, while prior studies focused on the 
types and levels of neutralization at work in online 
music piracy, the present study draws on their findings 
to pursue a uniquely different goal; to develop and 
implement persuasive techniques aimed at countering 
the effect of neutralization techniques used by “free” 
online music consumers.  
 
3. Research Model 
 
The research model for this study is shown in 
Figure 1. In the sections below, we develop hypotheses 
about consumer willingness-to-pay in PWYW contexts 
under persuasive intervention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Willingness-to-Pay for Online Music under 
PWYW 
 
In a PWYW setting where consumers can 
determine any price for the product they buy, the final 
prices paid consists of two principal components: the 
buyers’ internal reference price (their valuation of the 
normal cost of the product) and the proportion of the 
reference price that the buyer is willing to discharge to 
the seller (Kim et al, 2009). The marketing literature 
suggests that reference prices have a strong impact on 
consumer behavior [52]; [53]. Consumers’ perceptions 
of current prices are influenced by their internal 
reference prices based on past prices or on externally 
provided prices such as advertised prices or prices of 
competing products [54]. This argument is related to 
the notion of constructed preferences [68] which 
suggests that consumers are often uncertain about their 
valuation of a product and use cues to determine their 
willingness to pay (WTP). While such cues can be 
consumers’ internal reference price or an externally 
provided reference price, PWYW products often offer 
no external reference prices for products traded and 
consumers have to rely solely on their internal 
reference prices [10].  
Online pirates have been shown to deny 
responsibility for their actions on the basis that it is not 
financially possible to legally purchase all the music 
they desire [24]. Yet, consumers who frequently access 
online music for free may not even be aware of market 
prices of full albums or individual track downloads. 
Therefore, when a legitimate channel is made available 
under PWYW, denial of responsibility for payment by 
“free” consumers may arise from the ambiguity of 
prices they think they are expected to pay, irrespective 
of their valuation of the music. This allows them to 
contend that if an anchor price for downloading music 
were clearer, then they would resort to setting a 
reasonable price for the music. Therefore, this 
neutralization technique on the part of the consumer 
can be directly countered with a persuasive 
intervention designed to present external reference 
prices for consumers (e.g compare prices on iTunes, 
etc.) while in the process of purchasing music under 
PWYW. Empirically, Regner and Barria [9] found that 
the recommended payment of $8 for an album was 
actually paid 55% of the time, although their voluntary 
pricing scheme was not a true PWYW because it 
required a $5 minimum payment which was paid by 
14% of the consumers. Therefore, in PWYW context, a 
persuasive intervention that provides an external 
reference price will serve as an additional cue to aid 
the construction of a consumer’s internal reference 
price in the direction of an economically acceptable 
price range. The first hypothesis is thus: 
    H1: Implementation of persuasive techniques in  
  a PWYW platform will increase internal  
  reference price valuation by consumers of  
  online music 
 
In addition, a PWYW setting that gives absolute 
control of price determination to a buyer should lead a 
rational customers who wishes to maximize her single 
purchase utility to exploit the mechanism to pay a price 
of zero [10]. However, this is often not the case 
because the exchange between the buyer and seller is 
governed more by social-market than money market 
relationships [57]. That is, in money-market 
H2 
H3 
Figure 1. Consumer WTP under Persuasion in PWYW  
Pricing for Online Music 
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relationships, exchange between two parties is 
regulated by the use of a value or a utility metric, e.g., 
the price for a product [58] but non-posted prices or 
non-payments lead exchange partners to act according 
to social exchange norms (i.e., norms of reciprocity, 
norms of cooperation or norms of distribution) [59] 
which in turn influence the buyer’s behavior [57]. 
Since PWYW dissolves the usual money-market 
relationship between seller and buyer, the use of social 
exchange norms such as impression management (not 
willing to appear cheap) and avoiding social 
disapproval should lead individuals to pay prices 
greater than zero at PWYW in face-to-face interactions 
[10]. Empirically, field studies on consumers’ WTP 
under PWYW find that consumers often pay positive 
amounts due to pro-social behaviors ([58]; [59]; [8]; 
[9]).  
 Pro-social behaviors arising from online social 
influence has been shown to influence consumer 
decisions such as what music to subscribe for [60] or 
listen to [61], what books to purchase [62], what videos 
to watch on youtube [63], and how much contribution 
to make in crowdfunding [64]. Given the strong impact 
of social influence on online consumer behavior, pro-
social persuasive techniques that operationalize 
measures to counter neutralization techniques used by 
“free” consumers are likely to effectively motivate 
them to share a higher proportion of their surplus with 
the music provider. That is, individuals who consume 
free online music are known to employ neutralization 
techniques such as denial of responsibility (when 
individuals note the widespread availability of 
unauthorized music online or the ambiguity of laws 
regulating downloading);  denial of injury/denial of 
victim (when individuals feel that the recording 
industry reaps a sizable profit and has enough capital 
not to suffer lost revenue from free downloads);  
condemnation of condemners (when individuals fault 
the music industry for ‘‘overcharging’’ the consumer 
through monopolistic practices); and appeal to higher 
loyalties (when individuals contend that obtaining the 
unauthorized music fulfills a greater cause or purpose, 
such as meeting the needs of significant others or a 
work or school obligation) ([30]; [24]).  
 In a PWYW setting, these rationalizations will 
negatively influence the proportion of surplus 
consumers will be willing to share with the music 
provider. Yet, because such rationalizations are very 
personal, they may not sufficiently manifest 
themselves in social norms to be influenced by social 
media interventions alone. Personal rationalizations 
can be challenged by presenting persuasive arguments 
framed to respond directly to the neutralization 
techniques used by free music consumers. Such 
persuasive techniques designed to expose illegitimate 
justifications for errant behavior can cause consumers 
to revise their attitudes, assumptions and beliefs held 
about free online music and likely increase the 
proportion of surplus they will share with PWYW 
music providers. Personal rationalizations can be 
further weakened by additional persuasive techniques 
such as providing a simulating experience for 
consumers to directly link their payments to a music 
provider’s increased wealth, providing tailored 
feedback to reinforce positive payments, timing 
persuasive messages to appear at an opportune time 
(kairos effect) ([43]; [44]), and using seductive design 
techniques such as aesthetics, humor, curiosity, 
surprise and delighters [45] to elicit positive user 
emotions while they are engaged on the PWYW 
platform. Given that persuasive techniques can 
neutralize the rationalizations employed by free 
consumers in PWYW and encourage them to perform 
more pro-social behaviors, the second hypothesis is 
thus: 
    H2: Implementation of persuasive techniques in  
  a PWYW platform will increase the  
  proportion of surplus shared by consumers  
  of online music 
 
3.3. WTP and Music Revenues in PWYW 
under Persuasion 
 
We propose that under persuasion, the level of 
revenue realized will be influenced by persuasive 
techniques through their effects on internal reference 
price and proportion of surplus shared. Hypothesis 1 
and 2 suggest that persuasive techniques designed to 
attenuate the use of neutralization techniques by 
PWYW music consumers will increase their internal 
reference price valuation for music and the proportion 
of surplus they might be willing to share. If these 
manipulations are successful, the final prices paid for 
music will be higher than in PWYW contexts with no 
persuasions. Yet, neutralization theory would suggest a 
more nuanced effect of the drivers of internal reference 
price and proportion of surplus shared by consumers 
on the final prices paid. That is, research on 
neutralization theory proposes that the relationship 
between neutralizations and deviance may be 
curvilinear ([65]; [49]) because individuals who rely 
most on neutralizations to excuse their behavior are 
those who are only partly committed to the behavior 
under study. In other words, neutralization techniques 
may not be relevant for those individuals who are 
either totally committed to conventional behaviors or 
totally committed to deviant behaviors [65].  
 The nonlinear effect of neutralization techniques 
has been found significant cross-sectionally across 
different levels of student participation in music piracy 
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(Ingram and Hinduja, 2008) and longitudinally across 
earlier versus later levels of music piracy over a four-
week study [30]. Drawing on these findings, persuasive 
interventions designed to counter neutralization 
techniques may also result in nonlinear effects on WTP 
and revenues realized from music consumers in 
PWYW. Specifically, consumers may initially respond 
to moderate levels of persuasive techniques by 
upwardly adjusting their internal reference prices and 
proportion of surplus they want to share until the level 
of their perceived control (e.g. ability to pay for music 
based on their income) [25]. However, stronger 
persuasive techniques (e.g. providing a “too high” 
external reference price cue) will lead consumers to 
believe they have little control over their WTP. 
Consequently, they may choose not to make any 
purchase on the PWYW platform because they are no 
longer able to rely on neutralization techniques to 
suppress their guilty feeling about their inability to pay 
for the music. Thus, consumers may experience a form 
of disutility whereby marginal increment in persuasive 
techniques beyond their perceived control over their 
WTP causes them to altogether abandon the music sold 
through PWYW. The likely effect on revenue is that 
higher prices will be paid for lower or higher volume 
of downloads (depending on song popularity) until 
consumers perceive a lack of control over their WTP, 
resulting in low volume of downloads. Formally, these 
arguments are stated in the following hypotheses: 
    H3a: High internal reference price and proportion  
  of surplus shared by consumers under a  
  moderate level of persuasion in PWYW will  
  lead to high prices paid  
 
      H3b: High internal reference price and proportion  
  of surplus shared, induced via a higher level  
  of persuasion in PWYW will lead to non- 
  payment  
 
4. Methods 
 
4.1. Experimental Design 
 
We have selected to test our model by developing 
a persuasive system to conduct a lab   experiment, an 
approach that is consistent with recent studies in 
behavioral economics. In our experimental set up, the 
unit of analysis is a song offered through the context of 
PWYW. We will implement a 3x4 factorial design in 
which we use 3 levels of persuasion (control, 
moderate, and high) to manipulate four types of 
persuasive techniques (techniques that counter denial 
of responsibility, denial of injury/victim, condemnation 
of condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties). The 
dependent variable is the price paid for music by 
participants. 
 
4.2. Operationalization 
 
The PWYW context is being operationalized as 
an online website that hosts songs for participants to 
sample and purchase. Song profiles are differentiated 
by quality using chart rankings and all participants 
have access to the same song list. Participants are 
asked to browse all songs and determine the price they 
would pay for each song (i.e. their internal reference 
price). Participants then have the option of purchasing 
the songs they like by making an offer (i.e. the actual 
price paid) and downloading their chosen songs. To 
avoid anchoring effects between their internal 
reference price and the actual prices paid, each song is 
matched with a similarly ranked song and participants 
determine prices for the first list of songs (list A) but 
make purchases in the matched list of songs (list B). In 
effect, participants’ reference prices for songs on list A 
will be matched to their purchase prices for similarly 
ranked songs on list B.  
 Persuasive techniques is operationalized as 
additional features on the PWYW website. The control 
condition will have no persuasive elements and 
participants will have access to only the basic features 
of the PWYW context. The treatment conditions will 
have persuasive elements embedded in the PWYW 
context. These elements aim to provide feedback to 
participants on the impact of their performance 
(willingness to pay) while also generally eliciting 
positive emotional excitation to encourage them to be 
more willing to pay for songs.  
The levels of persuasion will be operationalized 
with persuasive messages framed to counter the 
neutralization techniques used by “free” music 
consumers. Our persuasive techniques counter four 
types of neutralization techniques used by free music 
consumers and are largely adapted from instruments 
used by Hinduja [51] and Ingram and Hinduja [24]. 
For the levels of persuasion, the control condition will 
get no messages for any type of persuasive technique. 
The moderate condition (moderate persuasion) 
provides mild persuasive messages designed to counter 
claims of denial of responsibility, denial of 
injury/victim, condemnation of condemners, and 
appeal to higher authority in order to encourage 
participants to understand the need to pay for music 
and act accordingly. The high condition (high 
persuasion) provides stronger persuasive messages 
designed to counter neutralization techniques but make 
participants feel the demands made of them are too 
high even though they understand the need to pay for 
music. 
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 4.3. Data Collection 
 
Data is collected through a web-based 
experimental survey. In the first phase, we are 
targeting undergraduate university students. We intend 
to complement this data with additional data from 
Mechanical Turkers in phase 2. Although there are 
concerns with student samples for generalizing to the 
broader population, its use in the current study is 
appropriate because it has been reported that young 
people are the most likely to obtain their music for free 
[11] and university environments have been described 
as hotbeds for free downloading of digital songs [4]. 
Our 3x4 factorial design has 12 cells in total and we 
calculate that at conventional alpha, a sample size of 
240 (20 per cell between-group) will yield adequate 
power to detect a medium effect size. Participants will 
be randomly assigned to a cell. The data collected from 
students include reference prices for songs on list A, 
paid prices for matched songs on list B, and the 
number of downloads for songs on list B. Additionally, 
students will provide responses to demographic 
questionnaires. Students who agree to participate are 
provided a link to one of the PWYW context websites 
where they read introduction to the tasks to be 
performed and sign consent forms.  A pre-test is being 
conducted with a small set of students to assess and 
improve the psychometric properties of manipulations 
before the main data collection.  
  
4.4. Manipulation Checks 
 
On completion of the experiment, all participants 
will be asked to complete an exit questionnaire which 
asks whether their reference prices determined for 
songs on list A influenced their actual payments for 
songs downloaded on list B. In addition, participants in 
the persuasive conditions will be asked whether they 
found (counter-neutralization) persuasive messages 
reasonable or outrageous. Participants in the high 
persuasion condition will be asked to indicate whether 
messages made them feel guilty and yet perceive a lack 
of control over their ability to pay. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our on-going study aims to understand the 
welfare of music providers who rely on PWYW 
pricing schemes to sustain their profitability in a digital 
environment that fosters free consumption of their 
products. We have proposed a model to explain how 
consumers purchasing music in a PWYW scheme can 
be persuaded to pay amounts significantly different 
from $0. Using theories of neutralization and 
persuasive computing design principles, the proposed 
model suggests that persuasive techniques framed 
around messages that counter the rationalizations 
individuals use to consume music for free can 
encourage them to change their behavior and pay for 
online music. The study aims to test this model through 
an online survey-based lab experiment. 
However, although experiments offer a high 
degree of control, we recognize in advance the threat to 
internal validity that can arise from halo effects 
between asking participants to state a reference price 
and then asking them to purchase a song. That is, 
participants’ willingness to pay may be confounded by 
the experimental manipulation. To address this 
problem, the study proposes to use a matched pair of 
songs in order to match reference price stated for one 
song to the price paid for the counterpart song. Yet, the 
selection and matching of songs warrants additional 
caution.   
The results expected from the study will have 
some important implications for management of digital 
music production and distribution and research on 
pricing models for digital goods. For managers of 
digital music, recent progress in digital music 
distribution through legal retailers such as iTunes and 
streaming services such as Spotify have not 
discouraged music piracy through illegal peer-to-peer 
(P2P) file-sharing networks, cyberlockers and 
aggregators, unlicensed streaming and stream ripping 
services. Lost revenues from piracy continue to dwarf 
realized revenues from digital music sales, and the 
quest for more effective pricing schemes that can 
convert more pirates to pay for music is still necessary. 
The current study can potentially make a contribution 
in this area. If persuasive techniques can mitigate the 
risks involved in PWYW pricing schemes, music 
providers will have an additional pricing strategy for 
targeting a segment of the pirates who rely on 
neutralization techniques to justify their behavior. For 
research, results from the proposed study can 
contribute an understanding of persuasive techniques 
as a more effective mechanism for eliciting pro-social 
behaviors to study and manipulate their impact on 
consumer behavior in online digital goods and services 
marketed through social influence. In this regard, our 
study potentially contributes to growing calls by 
information systems scholars (e.g. [6]; [67]) to 
consider the role of social factors in the digital business 
strategies of content providers.  
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